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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ]

Case No. 900443-CA

vs.
i
]

FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after a
conviction for a number of felonies.

Appellant filed his Notice

of Appeal with the trial court, indicating that jurisdiction may
be proper in either the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of
Appeals.

Thereafter, the appeal was lodged with this Court and

jurisdiction of this Court is therefore conferred by 78-2(a)3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
POINT I:

WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL VIOLATED BY A TRIAL OCCURRING SOME
11 MONTHS AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS
ARRESTED, IN VIEW OF HIS MOTION LODGED
WITH THE COURT FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL AND HIS
DISPOSITION LETTER LODGED WITH THE UTAH
STATE PRISON SOME NINE MONTHS PRIOR TO
THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL?

POINT II:

DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT, BOTH
IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH (OF HIS PERSON)
AND A SEARCH PURSUANT TO A WARRANT (OF
HIS PROPERTY) IN VIOLATION OF THE
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION?

POINT III:

DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE STATE'S
BURDEN OF PROOF AND REASONABLE DOUBT IN
VIEW OF CONTROLLING CASE LAW FROM THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT?

POINT IV:

WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
VIOLATED BY THE COURT'S ORDER PROHIBITING
HIM FROM PRESENTING RELEVANT EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The determinative constitutional provisions are as follows:
1.

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah

provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall be issued, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

2

3.

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah

provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellant was convicted of the

crimes of burglary, a second degree felony, theft, a class B
misdemeanor, and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony,
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
of from five years to life, on the first degree felony; from one
to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on the second degree felony;
and to six months on the class B misdemeanor.

Said sentences to

run concurrent, one with another. The proceedings occurred in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on trial by jury, presided over by the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Court Judge.
B. Course of Proceedings. Appellant was convicted of the
crimes of burglary, a second degree felony, theft, a class B
misdemeanor, and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony,
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
of from five years to life, on the first degree felony; from one
to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on the second degree felony;
and to six months on the class B misdemeanor.

Said sentences to

run concurrent, one with another. The proceedings occurred in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on trial by jury, presided over by the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Court Judge.
3

On the 7th day of August, 1990, the defendant, through
counsel herein, filed his Notice of Appeal, appealing the abovereferred to conviction to the Utah Supreme Court and/or the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion to

Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence, both evidence seized pursuant
to warrant and evidence seized without a warrant; additionally, he
filed a Motion to Dismiss for violation of defendant's speedy trial
rights.

All of these motions were denied by the Court and the

matter went to trial.
During the trial and at the conclusion of all the evidence,
the Court instructed the jury regarding its burden of proof and
reasonable doubt, which defendant believes constituted improper
jury instructions on those issues. During the course of the trial,
defendant attempted to illicit evidence from a witness regarding
his whereabouts on the day of the occurrence of the crime.

The

State objected to the receipt of such evidence and the Court
sustained that objection.

Thereafter, defendant moved the Court

for a mistrial on that basis, and that motion was denied by the
Court.
C. Disposition at Trial Court. A Judgment and Commitment
in the case was entered by the Court on the 27th day of July, 1990,
committing him to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
of from five years to life on the first degree felony, and from one
to 15 years on the second degree felony.
On the 7th day of August, 1990, defendant, through counsel,
filed his Notice of Appeal.
4

u.

Relevant Facts,
i.

Facts regarding defended^ ^ speejj triax isj^e
Defendant was arrested at approximatel

August *±,
:c

.

'

'

an \mre-

agents of

M u t Probation ami Parole

. ,

rs

"-

anscript,

Volume
iformatior

charging

me

defendant

burglary, t .-.; * .-::, , *
with the Court or ,r about September 12, 1989.

r. ,4, ,.

2 9)
The defendant, b\

,

fll ed a Request for Speedy Triai -:r cr arjout October 31,
198S .

(I

* October

defendant caused . . *;e [ J I U ^;i
State Prison
I -

a >»-;*-:ce M~

1989,

t .t */>,: ;»

Disposition, pursuant t:: tne

\ 111 • i

"* *

"i served - ^n \<y

of that Notice of Disposition o; t:,c Deputy Countv .. —
prosecuting this ca?-:

;~^3)

Ti: le del*-

e charges

the District Court on November . H, I ?8^, e-^nt months
his arrest.
""- •

i
r:*-:

(Tri a] Transcript, Volume I], pp. -"-3)

'),',' Fehi nai y I

! '»'•

the defendant being present.

; h»< •* i nq 'wiru^-'-J without
A1

"h.il • i me,

Transcript Volume I refers to transcript of proceeding
covering March 9, 1990, through July 27, 1990; Transcript
Volume II refers to transcript of proceeding commencing
November 24, 19 89 and concluding February 16, 1990; "R"
refers to the record * ippeal.
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Bugdon, defendant's previous counsel, appeared before the
Judge, with the Deputy County Attorney being present but
the defendant not being present and asked to withdraw as
counsel for the defendant.

That Motion was granted, and

counsel herein was appointed to represent the defendant
thereafter.
Prior

(Trial Transcript, Volume II, pp. 4-5)
to

allowing

previous

counsel

to withdraw,

defendant caused to be filed pro se, a withdrawal of
counsel, a letter to the judge indicating that a conflict
with counsel existed and another letter dated February 1,
1990, along with other various pro se motions, entitled
Motion to Suppress Warrants.

(Record, pp. 35-39.

In a Minute Entry dated February 20, 1990, the Court
cancelled the trial which was scheduled for February 22,
1990, without a hearing or without the defendant beingpresent.
Counsel herein was appointed and appeared with the
defendant on March 9, 1990 (Record, p. 48), and thereafter
filed various motions prior to trial.
The trial occurred on July 25, 1990.

A full eleven

plus months, from the date of defendant's arrest, and a
full eight months from the date of defendant's arraignment,
and nine months after the defendant's notice of disposition
letter.
2.

(Record, p. 178, Tr. No. 1)
Facts regarding search and seizure issue.

On August 21, 1989, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,
6

parole officers Scott Carver and Kevin Westover went to
uei •. '

.

: on

defendant pursuant to n

intensive parole agreement that

defendant h=o witn *"he State of Utah.
were
3t

,

At that time, they

• -• . *

1 le defendant was

is girlfriend's house, L.na.« Villagrana.

the terms of the intensive pare,

Pursuant to

agreement, defendant was

under curfew terms ana
Avenue address at t.L r

* mf

Based

'milt; 1 on , officers Carver arid Westover went
-•

-

.ilagrana home, arriving :,..*.;*

10:50 p.m. on that evening.

,

- /

(Tr. No
* uie villagrana home, uiv

observed through ine iro;,t window +-hp defendant runnii.-;.
through the kitchen towards tie bacK ioor

Officer Carver

sei i t Off: ceit : Westover ai c:>i ;;n id t :: • the 1: ack of the residence,
and Officer Carver hollered to Officer Westover t^at
coming o r
back

.»-).-

-

Officer Westover went arouno :.• tr.e

II

*•

was still inside of * * *- house and ordered him :.J - i .
then directed r*--' defendant to come out, the back doom
Of f: i i: i i

('"

:

time

f

• r- telephone, although both had oeen

regarc. -

warrants.

II

•. ; * tie officers seek either iiu arrest

warrant, personally
trained

i

to

(Tr. No. I, pp. 2 8-43)
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The defendant was arrested for a parole violation•
(Record, p. 24)

At the time of defendant's booking into

the Salt Lake County Jail, he was searched and a piece of
glass was retrieved from defendant's pant pocket and given
to Officer Westover.

(Tr. No. 1, p. 25)

Officer Carver received a telephone call from the Salt
Lake City Police Department on August 22, 1989, regarding
the defendant's status as a suspect in the burglary and a
request to turn over the glass to them. Officer Carver did
that.

(Tr. No. 1, p. 26)

On August 28, 1989, a search warrant was obtained from
a circuit court judge pursuant to an affidavit signed by
Officer Jensen of the Salt Lake City Police Department.
(Record, p. 71-86)

In that Affidavit, Officer Jensen

states: "They (the victims) discovered the suspect in this
case, Floyd Maestas, inside, and chased him away." Officer
Jensen did not tell the issuing Magistrate of that search
warrant that the victims of the burglary had been provided
with an opportunity to identify the defendant by photo
spread, and had been unable to identify the defendant from
that photo spread.

(Tr. No. 1, p. 39)

On September 7, 1989, another search warrant was
sought and obtained from another circuit court judge,
authorizing the seizure of certain property being held in
a fiduciary capacity by the Salt Lake County Jail on the
defendant's behalf.

(Record, pp. 71-86)
8

The affiant in

that affidavit was Officer Jensen, and the same language
appedf MU I I. I In. <il 1 irj.i 'i 1 . I*. • if.fi' i*1 ' 1 that search warrant
iT r , No. I

as referenced above.

|>- 10)

The second search warrant authorized the seizure of
""I1"fi«-»» l. i, i :sl ise.i reli «/.irrant . - u i t h o r i z e d t h e

defenudnt i, I lucid

(Recor;. rr 7"i-

seizure of defendant's personal property.

Facts regarding jury instruc^imu,.
he conclusion of defendant'^ trii"1
i ns *

* ! t

regardin

reasonable dour:
alternative

•

burder

(Record,

instructions

of

-

or

+-he court
:,m ^

it ;

-

reasonable

-• *

doubt, and

the

Lne reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction, which were rejectee
156-157)

Exceptions

-

were

taken

(Record,
to

tne

Coi irt

_ve defendants requested
instructions.

-

.40-341)

Facts regarding due process violation,
> «»- \ < * rr.

his girLfriend, who * *•> :-^i
evening of August 2\
e.1 iicl I,

t

19RL<

,

*-»

- iefendant

attempted
uu

r

including abou^

^r

~ugusL

,,

evening.

•<..

where

^ through and

p

that

evidence,
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a;

tne

Based upon the failure

o I t li e, u e i «:;
to

T? *-he day and

,, .

. -.

defendant had been

objected

ed as a witness

.-. -.

objectior

tate
was

sustained, thus preventing the defendant from presenting
this evidence to the trier of fact. (Record, pp. 315, 337)
At the next available recess, the defendant moved for
mistrial based upon the Court's ruling.
denied.

That motion was

(Tr. No. 1, pp. 337-339)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Because the trial of this case occurred some 11 months
after the defendant's

arrest, and nine months

after he had

requested the Court for a speedy trial and filed with the Utah
State Prison a demand for disposition, the defendant's rights to
a speedy trial were violated, and for that reason, the defendant's
conviction should be reversed.
The arrest of the defendant while inside his home without
a warrant violated the defendant's right under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.

And for such reason, the defendant's conviction should

be reversed and he should be given a new trial.
The search warrants obtained in this case were obtained
based upon statements made in the affidavit by a police officer
which were known to be false, or were made in reckless disregard
of the truth of the statement.

Without that false information,

there was not sufficient probable cause to authorize the search
warrant's issuance by the Magistrate.
The jury was improperly instructed by the Court as to the
burden of proof in a criminal case and the standard of reasonable
10

doubt,

Recent case law from the Utah Supreme Court supports the

:

-

•

j

appropriate instruction
proper
<. ( H

I

instruction

/ 1 1 . L i "i )i

ii I

i>eing the

i . *. • .

should result in a reversal

i* "

'

»

'

h

*L.* . U . L..^ :. J 4, -^

^ jury the

of defendant's

' ' i Ii I .

The defendant's uue process rights ir guaranteed
Federal Constitution and Article

Section

of

-.<

j

Kvr

the

State

LonaiJLUi 111in ,, i,.)U(j r a n Let;,1 . - <* - :
relevant evidence regarding his gui.*
defendant to provide notice n+" a!?M
an

order

prohibi ti rug

...

:

laie

--r*t

law requirinc the

^*- l failing there, r esu!" in

.- - -^

;^L ,f y

violates the defendant's due process rights, both under the Federal
r - * • - Km ii and the Utah State Constitution, in Artie 1 e I, Section
;

r

k iefendant shoula i;-e -given a n e w t r i a] :i n ti la t ti le Cour t' s

d e n i a ; of defendant's, Motion for M i s t r i a l w a s in e r r o r .
ARGUMENT
POINT T:

THE DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES WERE
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT'S
TRIAL OCCURRING 11 MONTHS AFTER HIS
ARREST, WHEN HE HAD REQUESTED AN EARLY
TRIAL, AND PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW, HAD
REQUESTED THAT THE MATTER BE TRIED WITHIN
120 DAYS.
IOWS:

After written demand as required in subsection
(1), the prosecuting or the defendant or his
counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
In the ev ent the charge is not brought to
trial wi t:h:i i ] 20 dayr or within such continuance
]1

as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review
the proceeding. If the court finds the failure of
the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance
was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
It is important to note that at not time did defendant,
either pro se or through his appointed lawyer, move the Court for
a continuance.

He provided the prosecuting attorney with a copy

of his letter regarding his request for disposition of the pending
charges.

The February 16, 1990 hearing in which his previous

lawyer was allowed to withdraw occurred without the defendant being
present.

Even

in that hearing, there was

no motion

for

continuance sought. The State of Utah cannot escape responsibility
for not trying Mr. Maestas within the time period by pointing to
the fact that he apparently had some conflict with previous
counsel.

The statute is clear that the State bears the burden of

convincing the trial court first, and then this court, that
whatever continuances were sought, obtained and granted, were for
"good cause shown."

In this case, there is simply no "good cause

shown" why this matter was continued some 11 months after this
man's arrest.
Additionally, the

statute

does not

require

that the

defendant suffer prejudice in order to avail himself of the
provisions of this particular statute. The statute simply provides
that the Court review the proceedings, and in the event that the
Court concludes that the statute was not complied with, then he
shall dismiss the matter with prejudice.
12

It is appellant's

contention that under Utah law, the matter should not have been
tried in violation of Utah law.
The
different.

constitutional

speedy

trial

right

is

a

little

The seminal case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514

(1972), sets forth the constitutional analysis for speedy trial
issues.
In Barker, the Court established

four factors to be

considered when evaluating whether a pretrial delay violates the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial:

(1) the length of the

delay; (2) the justification for the delay; (3) that nature of the
prejudice to the accused; and (4) the degree to which the accused
asserted his right to be tried promptly.

None of the factors is

absolutely determinative of the issue; rather, each factor is
related and must be considered in conjunction with the others. A
strong showing of prejudice is not necessarily a prerequisite to
a

speedy trial violation.

Moreover, the prosecution cannot

inadvertently avoid the sanction of dismissal by asserting that the
delay was inadvertent.
This Court, in State v. Trafny,

P.2d

, 145

Ut.Adv.Rpt. 13, 15 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990) has adopted the Barker test.
In analyzing the four Barker factors.

There can be no

question that the length of delay was significant.

Additionally,

there can be no question that the delay that occurred was not
justified.

Lastly, the degree to which the accused asserted his

right to be tried promptly weighs in the favor of the defendant.
Not only did he file a request to the Court for a speedy trial, but
13

he also complied with Utah law in requesting that the matter be
disposed of within the statutory period of time.

The factors of

prejudice to the accused is somewhat more troubling. The existence
of prejudice must be evaluated in light of the purposes underlying
the right to a speedy trial.

As noted in Barker, those purposes

are the prevention of oppressive incarceration; the minimization
of anxiety; and the impairment of a defense.
In this case, though the defendant is unable to establish
with mathematical precision the prejudice associated with the
delay, the

important

constitutional

principals

recognized

in

affording a person a speedy trial should be protected by this Court
in the absence of a strong showing of prejudice.
POINT II:

THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT AT
THE TIME OF HIS ARREST AND EVIDENCE
SEIZED FROM HIM PURSUANT TO WARRANTS
WHICH WERE FLAWED.

The arrest of the defendant for violating the terms and
conditions of his parole without a warrant violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, both under the Federal and State Constitutions.

The

officers were obligated to acquire a warrant before entering his
residence to arrest him.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue
in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In holding that absentconsent or exigency, an arrest warrant is required before a suspect
can be arrested in his home.

The Supreme Court acknowledged in

Payton that a basic principle of constitutional law is that a
14

warrant is required before a person may be arrested in his home.
Lower courts have continued to address the ramifications
of the Payton decision, and have concluded that the meaning of
"home" extends to motel rooms and other such facilities.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded in U.S.
v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1983) that one of the factors
to be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances exist
was the time required to obtain a telephonic warrant. Recognizing
that the requirement of the warrant to enter a person's home is
almost absolute, regardless of the abundance of probable cause or
other reasons which justify the intrusion.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Northrup, 756 P.1228
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988) has recognized the viability of the Payton
analysis based on Utah constitutional law in connection with a
warrantless search or arrest in an individual's home.
In Northrup, a co-defendant had been given money on two
separate

occasions

by

police

officers

and

defendant's home and returned with cocaine.
entry, this defendant was arrested

had

entered

the

On the date of the

after coming out of the

defendant's home, and another individual had been stopped and held
for questioning until later that evening.

The officers then

entered the defendant's home without a warrant. After entering the
home, the officers secured a search warrant and executed that
warrant and seized various items of incriminating evidence.

This

Court held, in striking down the warrantless search, as follows:
First we examine whether the police officers'
entry into the home prior to the arrival of the
15

search warrant violated Northrup's rights under the
Fourth
Amendment
to
the
United
State's
Constitution. Physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed. (citations omitted) The
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which
is imposed on agents of the government who seek to
enter a home for purposes of search or arrest, is
the principal protection against unnecessary
intrusions into private dwellings, thus, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized as a basic
principle, that search and seizures inside the home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
It is important to keep in mind the facts associated with
the arrest.

The officer's testimony was clear that he indicated

to the defendant that he should "halt" while the defendant was
still inside of his home. Thereafter, he proceeded out of the home
only at the officer's direction.
The evidence seized pursuant to warrants was seized in
violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and for such
reason the warrants should fail.

In both of the affidavits for

search warrants, the following language appeared:
They discovered the suspect in this case,
Floyd Maestas, inside and chased him away. One
warrant authorized the seizure of a yellow gold
chain with a cross and clothing. The other warrant
authorized the seizure of defendant's blood.
In Franks v. Delaware, supra, the United States Supreme
Court held that when a defendant makes a veracity challenge to an
affidavit in support of a search warrant, he is entitled, upon a
showing, to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the false
information was deliberately made or made with reckless disregard
for its truth.

If at the hearing these requirements are met, the

false information is to be taken out and the affidavit is to be
16

evaluated for probable cause, absent the falsity.

If the false

information conveyed in the affidavit, to wit, that the victims had
indicated that they specifically identified the defendant in their
house, the affidavit is completely devoid of any probable cause to
issue the respective warrants.
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with a Franks violation
in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, (Utah, 1986) cert denied, 107
S.Ct. 1565 (1987).

See also State v. Nielsen:

statements in search warrant affidavits.

immaterial false

87 U.L.R., 753.

It is clear that a Franks violation survives the modified
exclusionary rule of United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
The "exclusionary rule" as modified in Leon, requires suppression
of evidence obtained in violation of Franks.

In Leon, the Court

held at 3419:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate
remedy. If the magistrate or judge, in issuing a
warrant, was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard of the
truth.
The statement in the affidavits would lead an issuing
magistrate to conclude that the victims of this crime observed the
defendant, Floyd Maestas, in their home and chased him out.

In

truth and in fact, the witnesses had been shown a photo spread
containing a picture of Mr. Maestas and were unable to identify
him.
POINT III:

THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED
REGARDING THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CRIMINAL
CASE.
17

In this case, the Court gave the stock reasonable doubt
instruction with language familiar to everyone and the following
addition: "and obviates all reasonable doubt."
proposed

The defendant's

reasonable doubt instruction was an attempt to track

Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in State v. Ireland,

P.2d

, 108 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 3 (Utah 1989).
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Ireland became a
concurring

opinion

in State v. Johnson,

P.2d

, 108

Ut.Adv.Rpt. 44 (Utah 1989).
It is defendant's contention that his proposed reasonable
doubt

instruction

tracks the

Ireland

and Johnson

cases.

The

reasonable doubt instruction given by the Court did not take into
consideration the important issues raised by the above-cited cases,
and for said reasons, it was error to give that instruction.

This

Court should direct trial courts to frame a proper reasonable doubt
instruction so that a jury can be adequately advised regarding the
burden of proof in a criminal case.
POINT IV:

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PROHIBITING
DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE DENIED HIM HIS DUE PROCESS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF CALLING WITNESSES
TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE, AND HE IS
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.

In 1967, the United

States Supreme Court rendered

its

landmark decision in the case of Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967).

In that case, the Court dealt with the constitutionality

of two Texas statutes providing that an accused could not call as
a defense witness any person chcirged or previously convicted as a
18

principal, accomplice, or accessory in the crime.
rendered

such

persons

incompetent

as

Texas law

defense witnesses; the

statutes altogether precluded the accused from calling them as
witnesses at trial.
The accused, Jackie Washington, was charged with murder.
Washington attempted to call Charles Fuller as a witness.

Fuller

had already been convicted of murder in the same shooting incident.
Citing the two Texas statutes, the prosecutor objected to Fuller's
testimony; the trial judge sustained the objection.
benefit

of

convicted.

Fuller's

exculpatory

testimony,

Without the

Washington

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.

was

In doing

so, the Court issued two significant rulings.
First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren held
that the compulsory process guarantee is so fundamental that it is
incorporated

in the due process provision of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The guarantee is therefore enforceable directly against
the states.
Second, and even more importantly, the Court held that the
Texas statutes violated the guarantee.

Texas had argued that it

had not denied Washington compulsory process; it allowed him to
subpoena Fuller—it merely precluded him from calling Fuller as a
witness.

Chief Justice Warren concluded that "The framers of the

Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to
a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he has no right to use."
The Court went on to state:
19

This court had occasion In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) to describe . . . the most basic ingredients
of due process of law:
"a person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to
his day in court—are basic in our system of
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against
him and to offer testimony."
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is
in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so
it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law.2
The

Supreme

Court

in

1973

reaffirmed

the

Washington

doctrine when it decided Chambers v. Mississippif 410 U.S. 284
(1973).
the

One of the alleged constitutional errors in that case was

trial

evidence.

judge's

exclusion

of

critical

exculpatory

hearsay

The Court powerfully reaffirmed Washington.

Citing

Washington, Justice Powell found the trial judge's ruling violated
the accused's "right to present witnesses in his own defense." The
court thus refused to apply the right only to competency rules
altogether barring a witness' testimony; the court extended the
right to evidentiary rules which have the more limited effect of
preventing a witness from giving particular testimony.
Powell stressed that the testimony

Justice

in question was not only

critical to Chamber's defense, but also bore "persuasive assurances

2

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Amendment VI: The compulsory
process clause, September-October 1990, The Champion.
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of trustworthiness."

Coupled with another erroneous ruling, the

exclusion of the hearsay evidence "denied Chambers a trial in
accord . . . with due process."
More recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
this fundamental principal in Rock v. Arkansas,
S.Ct. 2704, 2712 (1987).

U.S.

, 107

In Rock, the United States Supreme Court

recognized that a state's rule barring a previously hypnotized
witness from testifying regarding post-hypnotic recall violated a
defendant's almost absolute right to offer evidence in his defense,
when the defendant himself had been hypnotized.

The Supreme Court

recognized that this "fundamental right" cannot be impaired through
a per se rule excluding hypnotically enhanced testimony.
The Rock case arose in a jurisdiction which followed a per
se rule barring the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
The United States Supreme Court in Rock directly held that an
evidentiary rule could not defeat a constitutional provision and
that the right of a defendant to testify, even after hypnosis, was
part of that "cluster" of rights which are beyond the reach of
mundane evidentiary rules.3
The Trial Court's ruling, excluding the presentation of
evidence, which is not properly characterized as alibi evidence,
constituted a violation of the defendant's due process rights as
articulated above.

3

Incidentally, when a Constitutional violation occurs
affecting that "cluster" of rights, the violation is not
subject to harmless error analysis. See Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's convictions should
be reversed and dismissed with prejudice, or a new trial ordered.
DATED this

day of December, 1990.
BROWN & COX
By:
KENNETH R. BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant
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